A disaggregation of CVS's income statement for the last six years is presented to support the contention that there is a significant disparity in operating income of CVS's pharmacy business
intermediate market countervailing power would behave asymmetrically -a powerful buy-side opponent to up-steam oligopolists, but a benevolent sell-side friend to down-stream consumers.
Wall Street also believes that the Express Scripts-Caremark merger would be anti-competitive, and profit-enhancing to the drug supply chain, as evidenced by upward movement in stock prices of Medco Health Solutions, Walgreen, and Rite-Aid. The opposite was the case a month earlier when the CVS-Caremark merger was announced, suggesting that Wall Street also concurred with our assessment that this merger would be pro-competitive, and profit-diminishing to the drug supply chain, on balance. 
The Motive for the CVS-Caremark Merger
It has been reported that the CEO's of both companies began talking a year ago about a potential merger. We believe that what finally drove the parties to consummate the deal was an announcement by Wal-Mart that its retail pharmacies would be offering a number of generic drugs for $4 per prescription.
Most Wall Street analysts downplayed the impact of this announcement. They viewed it though traditional price theory and concluded that the $4 price would cause only a limited number of people to "schlep" the extra miles in order to save a few dollars.
We view the Wal-Mart announcement as more than an innocuous "publicity stunt". The specificity of the $4 price was designed to be the tipping point of an "idea epidemic" that large, independent PBMs might not be negotiating the best possible deals for clients. Wal-Mart's strategy is to induce plan sponsors to put more pressure on their PBM vendors to bargain harder with the large drugstore chains. This pressure would destabilize tacit collusion among the Big 3 pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) -Caremark Rx, Medco Health Solutions, and Express Scripts --to hold up retail prices in order to make their mail order operations price competitive without margin erosion.
Without the merger, no independent PBM with captive mail order operations has an incentive to steer demand to any retailer. But, with the merger, Caremark would have the incentive to create greater retail volume to offset lower unit margins on retail prescriptions. Caremark would create this greater price elasticity of demand for CVS by moving toward a preferred provider retail network with real incentives for both plans and their members to choose CVS.
One purpose of this paper is to examine in more detail the precarious state of the CVS business model. A disaggregation of CVS's income statement for the last six years will be presented to support our contention that there is a significant disparity in operating income of CVS's pharmacy business versus the rest of its business known in the industry as the front store. This paper complements our earlier work on making the Walgreen business model more transparent. 1 We believe that the CVS-Caremark merger marks the beginning of a drugstore preferred provider war. We will present a number of insights into sensible partners for plans and PBMs by comparing state maps of drugstore concentration with maps of the dominant healthcare plan by state.
Based on our prior work on Walgreen's business model, we instantly sensed that the CVSCaremark merger had something to do with the vulnerable state of CVS's business model Even though it was announced as a "merger of equals", we were sure that CVS was the suitor and that Caremark was the catch. But, why did Caremark not command a premium over its existing stock market price?
Caremark's motive for agreeing to this merger is a mystery to us, and to Wall Street. Did it have something to do with trends in the PBM industry? Did it have something to do with Caremark's competitive situation within the industry? Or, was it motivated by some particular stock option situation involving Caremark's CEO, Mac Crawford?
There is one piece of evidence suggesting that the merger is not about market share of the Big 3
PBMs. It has been reported by Reuters that the CEO of CVS, Tom Ryan, met with the CEO's of two unnamed PBMs "to discuss industry matters" before the merger was announced.
2 The "unnamed" PBMs were likely Express Scripts and Medco. The significant of this revelation is that CVS found it important to discuss the impending merger with PBMs, and not drugstore chains. It is likely the purpose of these meeting was to assure Express Scripts and Medco that CVS would continue to work cooperatively with them even though CVS would be merging with their arch rival, Caremark.
Rejecting Value-Creation and Purchasing Power as Motives
We contend that the motive for the CVS-Caremark merge is revenue and market share as opposed to cost or value creation. The management of the two companies would deny this.
Their public stance is that the merger is motivated by cost and value creation, although they are
vague as to what steps they will be taking to achieve these goals. Consider the following Associated Press summary of the CVS-Caremark merger: 3 But the combined company to be called CVS/Caremark Corp. will be able to start saving the $400 million annually starting at the end of 2008, Howard A. McLure, Caremark's senior vice president and chief operating officer, said Wednesday. The buyout is still contingent on approval from shareholders and regulators.
These are savings that "I don't think you could obtain through a joint venture," McLure said at Merrill Lynch investor conference in New York. "These are mainly product acquisition costs, which I think you've got to have the transaction in order to get."
Dave Rickard, chief financial officer at CVS, declined to elaborate on specifics about where the companies will find those savings.
"Purchasing is the majority of it, and the purchasing synergies are expected to be nearly immediate," he said. "There is some operational efficiency cost reduction, and there is some overhead cost reduction. There are no revenue synergies within that $400 million number."
While senior officials cite cost-saving as the primary benefit of the merger, the CEO's of the two companies see "enhancing value" as the motive for the merger. Consider the following quote from CVS CEO Tom Ryan: 4 "Over the past year, Mac (Caremark CEO) and I have developed a shared view of where the healthcare market need to go and how we can work together to get there first. Employers and health plans want to control costs, but also want their plan members to have access to a full range of integrated pharmacy services… . Together, CVS and Caremark will help manage the costs and complexities of the U.S. healthcare system, offering unparalleled access and driving superior healthcare outcomes, enhancing value for employers, health plans, and consumers."
The problem with believing this as the motive for the merger is that the Big 3 PBMs no history of monetizing services. Clients of the Big 3 PBMs do not pay any significant management fees, such as per-member-per-month charges. The Big 3 PBM business model has been all about using hard-to-monitor margins on prescription transactions, rebate retention, and so-called "data fees" from brand drug manufacturers to subsidize value-added services such as formulary development and compliance, drug utilization review, and disease management. It is likely that clients would balk as significant fees to pay for new services created by the merger such as consumer-directed healthcare.
The problem with believing that purchasing power is the motive for the CVS-Caremark merger is that CVS can exercise discretion only in choices of generic drug manufacturers. For drugstore chains, the demand for brand drugs is a derived demand where PBMs (and physicians) are the only entities in the drug supply chain that can exercise discretion in the choices of brand drugs that are deemed therapeutic equivalents.
The the CVS merger proposal. Express Scripts stressed that the merger of two PBMs would produce more cost saving, which it placed at $500 million a year, than the merger of drugstore chain and a PBM, which CVS placed at $400 million a year. Within several hours, CVS CEO Tom Ryan countered with press release that represented the first reference to the possibility that the CVSCaremark merger might produce some "incremental revenues", something that a merger of two PBMs could not achieve: 5 "In contrast, our bid offers not only significant cost synergies, which we have conservatively estimated at $400 million, but also significant opportunities to drive incremental revenues that only a drugstore/PBM combination can achieve…."
PBMs as 'Enablers' of the Drugstore Chain Business Model
The deterioration of CVS's business model during the past six years has been "enabled" (as in assisting someone to persist in self-destructive behavior) by the Big 3 PBMs. Plan sponsors hire
PBMs for their expertise in negotiating prescription reimbursements with retail drugstores. At the same time, the Big 3 PBMs have captive mail order pharmacy operations that compete with retailers.
Having the power to price retail pharmacies has created a situation where the Big 3 PBMs tacitly collude to hold up prices at retail in order to offer their client plan sponsors lower mail order prices without suffering margin erosion. One piece of evidence that this hold up is occurring is the lack of preferred provider retail pharmacy networks with significant co-pay and reimbursement differences. Another piece of evidence is that Medco had to resort to predatory pricing of mail order brand prescriptions in order to offer the FEHPB prices so attractive that they would consider steering members to their captive mail order pharmacies. 6 Another is the PBM response to an arbitrary increase in the average wholesale price (AWP) mark-up ratio in 2002. 7 One final piece of evidence is a survey of prices offered by various Medicare-endorsed, discount prescription card programs in the year preceding Medicare Part D. 8 The survey revealed that the card sponsored by PharmaCare, CVS's own captive PBM, was the price leader. We contend that this result demonstrates the degree to which PBMs can get better pricing from retailers if they are not worried about protecting their captive mail order operations.
Preferred provider networks with real differentiation --a form of price competition -are common in other areas of managed care like hospitals and physicians groups where conflict of interest is deterred by strict rules prohibiting ties between payers and providers. The payer-as-provider conflict of interest should end when a PBM with captive mail order operation is itself a captive of an insurance company. Here the interest of a captive PBM is aligned with the parent insurance company. The common objective is to get the best price regardless of channel of distribution.
Examples of this corporate structure include Aetna, CIGNA, WellPoint, and Prime Therapeutics, which is owned by Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) licensees.
It is a mystery to us why insurance companies with captive PBMs, like Aetna and Prime Therapeutics, have failed to develop highly differentiated retail pharmacy networks. This might be understandable for Aetna and CIGNA because their membership is spread out nationally and they lack the local critical mass necessary to be a potent negotiator with CVS and Walgreen. But, this is not the case with Prime Therapeutics or WellPoint's PBM because they often represent BCBS plans that are the dominant healthcare plan in the states in which they do business.
It could be that being the dominant plan in a state works in opposite directions as a factor in network development. On the one hand, the dominant plan has great bargaining power with local providers. On the other hand, the dominant plan faces little competition locally so there is little pressure to push the managed care envelope at the expense of member freedom of choice. This might be the reason why captive PBMs of BCBS licensees historically have not shown interest in preferred provider pharmacy networks.
In the CVS-Caremark deal, CVS was the suitor and Caremark was the catch. We expect Walgreen and Rite-Aid also will take the lead creating preferred provider networks. It is the drugstore business with its "bricks and mortar" that is vulnerable to a new era of price competition. The Big 3 PBMs have demonstrated a remarkable ability to offset margin pressure in one area by adjusting margins on other services. 9 With the exception of its mail order operation, PBMs are basically application software providers with no real "bricks and mortar" other than their computer systems. The PBM business model could easily adapt to an era of price competition and reduced mail order margins by increasing prices for other services and by reversing the trend toward lower rebate retention rates.
Making the CVS Business Model Transparent
Large drugstore chains present their profit and loss statement to the public in a similar way. The presentation is clearly designed to steer a narrow course between the need to satisfy accounting regulations for segment reporting and the desire to mask the relative profitability of individual business segments. The chains disclose sales levels and growth rates by segment. But, they provide no breakdown of cost of sales, gross profit margins, operating expenses, and net income by line of business.
Three kinds of qualitative statements about gross profit margins are usually presented in financial statements submitted quarterly to the Securities and Exchange Commission: (1) the gross profit margin on generic prescriptions is greater than the gross profit margin on brand name prescriptions; (2) the gross profit margin of the front store is greater than the gross profit margin of the pharmacy; (3) the gross profit margin on cash sales -now less than 6% for each chain -is greater than the gross profit margin on sales covered by health insurance. The following is a typical statement by CVS on financial performance by segment. Our pharmacy gross margin rate continued to benefit from an increase in generic drug sales in 2005, which normally yield a higher gross margin than equivalent brand name drug sales.
Our gross margin rate continues to be adversely affected by pharmacy sales growing at a faster pace than front store sales. On average, our gross margin on pharmacy sales is lower than our gross margin on front store sales. There are two keys to a full disaggregation of CVS's income statement by segment. One is an estimate of the gross profit margin of the pharmacy segment. Given that figure from outside annual data provided by the National Association of Chain Drug Stores, simple algebra can be used to derive the gross profit of the front store based on CVS's own disclosures of sales percentages by segment and the aggregate gross profit margin.
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Large drugstore chains often boast that the front store gross profit margin is higher than that of the pharmacy operation as if this is sufficient assurance that the front store's financials are strong.
But, the bottom line is operating income margin, not gross profit margin, and that is the difference between the gross profit margin and operating expense margin. Disaggregation of operating expense by segment is the final step to making CVS's business model fully transparent.
This allocation of operating expenses by segment is subjective because it is hard to figure out the "drivers" of such costs. Chains probably have a cadre of cost accountants working full time on this task because understanding the profitability of individual business units is key to effective management of a large company. Any judgment of our effort in this area must be couched in relative terms.
It is reasonable to separate drugstore operating expenses in three classes --labor, facilities, and a big "bucket" for all other selling, general, and administrative costs. Labor is a relatively large operating expense for drugstore chains because they classify all labor as an operating expense rather than classify "direct" labor as cost of goods sold as is done by manufacturers.
The table below presents our allocation of CVS's 2005 operating expenses by segment. Even though CVS's pharmacy operation accounts for 70.2% of sales, we estimate that it accounts for only 42% of total operating expenses, including depreciation and amortization.
The pharmacy operation is a relatively efficient user of space as measured by sales per square foot. That "little hole in the wall" in the back occupies only about 20% of floor space --2,600 square feet of a typical 13,000 square store. Yet, it accounts for 70% of sales.
The pharmacy is also a relatively efficient user of labor even though individual pharmacists are highly paid. We estimate that the pharmacy accounts for about 55% of aggregate labor-related operating expenses, but, again, the pharmacy generate 70% of sales. The key result is that CVS's front store operating income has been negative for the last five years. (See graphs to follow and derived data in Appendix I) Even though CVS's front store enjoys a relative high gross profit margin, this has been eclipsed in recent years by a rising operating expense margin.
For CVS, the profitability of the pharmacy fortunately masks the red ink generated by its front store. We believe that the only difference between large drugstore chains today and dime store dinosaurs like Woolworth and McCrory's is the "little hole in the wall" in the back.
It is ironic that pharmacy profitability is higher today under managed care than previously when fee-for-service was prevalent. The proximate source of this new pharmacy profitability has been the explosive growth of drugs for chronic illnesses that has unleashed tremendous economies of scale and falling operating expense margins.
However, it is the job of PBMs to understand this dynamic. PBMs should have pressed for steeper prescription discounts in the face of a rising trend in drug costs in order to force gross profit margins to mirror the downward trend in operating expense margins. But, the Big 3 PBMs did not. The result has been a growing cross subsidy in the chain drugstore business model. This is how PBMs can be seen as "enablers" of the deterioration of the drugstore chain business model.
If retailers did not have the pharmacy profits to subsidize the front store, they would be forced to make changes designed to increase the net profitability of their front store. This would mean high prices for convenience goods and/or reduced operating expense margins through reduced store expansion in order to prop up front store sales per store.
But such moves play right into the hands of Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart can compete on price, but not on convenience. By forcing the big chain drugstores to eliminate cross-subsidies in its business model, Wal-Mart will be raising the cost of convenience. Wal-Mart is really after the front store as much as the pharmacy. The CVS-Caremark merger is designed to shore up pharmacy gross profits -increased traffic to offset lower unit margins --so as to avoid increasing the cost of front store convenience.
The following graphs summarize our effort at making CVS's business model transparent. The data that supports these graphs is displayed in Appendix I.
Even though CVS's overall profitability has been positive and steady… There is a great disparity in the sales growth rates of CVS's two segments… And a great disparity in profitability by segment. 
CVS' Overall Margins

CVS' Operating Income Margin by Segment
The Coming Preferred Provider War
Walgreen has signaled that it does not buy the line that the reason for the CVS-Caremark merger is to increase purchasing power. It senses a move against its market share. Consider the following quote by Walgreen's director of finance, 13 Walgreen Co. said it is remaining "cautious" about CVS Corp.'s $21 billion purchase of Caremark Rx Inc.
"We think there will be attempts by this entity to try to steal our customers," Rick Hans, Walgreens' director of finance, said at a conference Tuesday.
"We certainly have a certain amount of trepidation about the merger," Hans said. "Competitively, we will do whatever we need to do to respond."
Currently, PBMs create extensive retail networks with upwards of 60,000 pharmacies. Usually, the co-pay is the same for all pharmacies within the network. Also, PBMs generally are content to set a single reimbursement rate for all retailers -large or small. This benevolence allows low cost retailers like CVS and Walgreen to retain the "producer surplus". All of this will likely change with the CVS-Caremark merger.
Caremark will try to convince its clients to adopt a preferred provider network that favors CVS. As an incentive to use the preferred provider, it is reasonable to expect Caremark to institute the following:
(1) Low to nil co-pays if CVS is chosen, higher co-pays if another retailer is used 
Mapping the Preferred Provider War
We see this as series of fights to win the preference of the dominant plan in each stategenerally Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) plans. Increased market share will go to the winner.
The purpose of this section is to determine which states will be hotly contested and the strategy each of the three major drugstore chains might adopt. Another section will lay out the effect of these battles on supermarket and community pharmacies.
Geographic concentration of plan members and retail stores will be an important factor in negotiating price concessions in return for preferred provider status. Because the chains will be the initiators of this war, the starting place for understanding strategy is a map of relative store 
The Key Swing States
The real contests will take place in ten "swing" states where no chain has more than 50% share and where the leading chain's advantage is less than 10 percentage points. The But, Rite-Aid will be battling for its life in the swing states. Major loses by Rite-Aid in the four most populous swing state -California, Michigan, New York and Ohio -would be devastating.
The likely loser in the battle between #1 Walgreen and #2 CVS will be #3 Rite-Aid. This result is not surprising as it is generally the case that the strongest, most efficient firms gain market share in a price war.
Several other insights emerge from the above tables:
( 
The Impact on Other Pharmacy Groups
During the past eight years, both drugstore chains and community pharmacies have lost market share to supermarkets, mass merchants, and, especially, mail order pharmacies. 17 18 The top supermarkets chains with pharmacies are Kroger, SuperValu (recently buying the Albertson's chain), and Safeway. The top mass merchants with pharmacies are Wal-Mart and Target.
First and foremost, we believe that the CVS-Caremark merger and the coming preferred provider war is about chain drugstore market share with Rite-Aid being the big loser. Secondary, it is about stopping the trend in share gain by supermarkets. Supermarket pharmacies compete effectively with drugstore chains from a convenience standpoint. Unlike drugstore chains, supermarket pharmacies are not burdened by the need to subsidize other segments of the business. Supermarket pharmacies could weather more price competition and margin erosion without destabilizing the whole grocery store business model. The benefit of a price war among the three drugstore chains is that their arch rival supermarket chains will take a significant hit.
Today, less than 6% of chain drugstore customers are "cash-only." Even if mass merchants like
Wal-Mart and Target take all of this business away from drugstore chains with their $4 / generic prescriptions programs, it would represent only a swing of 2.4 percentage points. Walgreen and CVS should be able to cover this loss and more by taking share from Rite-Aid and supermarkets.
We do not believe that CVS wants to gain share at the expense of Caremark. While CVS might wish for Caremark to allow 90-day prescriptions to be filled at retail, it is certainly the last item on its list of ways to increase retail market share. However, the coming preferred provider war generally will lower reimbursement rate differentials between retail preferred providers and mail order pharmacies. Plan sponsors generally will be less receptive to suggestions to the steer members to mail order. So while the CVS might not intend on cannibalizing sales from Caremark, the overall trend to mail order should slow, or reverse, and all retail chains will benefit by this new era of retail price competition at the expense of mail order pharmacies.
We believe that community pharmacies will largely be unaffected by the coming preferred provider war. In the past, both large chains and community pharmacies received the same reimbursement and the same status. But, the uniform price approach to network reimbursement gave the large chains a healthy "producer surplus" while community pharmacies received a price that just covered their costs.
The Big 3 PBMs will continue to create rather comprehensive networks covering over 90% of all pharmacies in the country. Even though networks in the future are likely to be highly differentiated, PBMs still need to offer high reimbursement levels in order to attract enough community pharmacies to meet the coverage demanded by customers. As longer as customers demand expansiveness, the reimbursement levels that community pharmacies receive, although just covering their costs, should remain the same despite the coming preferred provider war.
Conflicts within CVS-Caremark
Some members of the retail community have wistfully speculated that CVS will soften up traditional PBM resistance to 90-day retail prescriptions. But, we believe that this is naïve because retail pharmacies now more than ever need increased traffic. The CVS people will be reluctant to press this issue out of fear that it will cause a net loss in retail traffic. If there is to be any change in this area, it will have to come from individual consumers complaining to their plan sponsors.
The real friction will come if the CVS people receive offers from Medco or Express Scripts to be their preferred provider. The Caremark people will press the CVS people not accept such offers because refusal would send a message to plans that Caremark is on only PBM that can deliver a quality preferred provider network in the East and South. 
CVS's Strategy
After comparing maps of drugstore concentration with maps of membership concentration, it becomes apparent that the pairing of Caremark with CVS makes sense from a preferred provider standpoint. According to Caremark's latest 10-K, the FEHBP is its single largest customer accounting for 16% of its business. 19 We believe that the "shared interests" mentioned by CVS CEO Tom Ryan as one of the subjects of his first meeting with Caremark a year ago referred to the FEHBP, whose members primarily reside in the Beltway states dominated by CVS. PharmaCare, the CVS captive PBM, serves the dominant BCBS plan of Rhode Island, an obvious "red" state as it is the location of CVS's corporate headquarters.
Concentration of FEHBP Members in Beltway
As we observed earlier, Caremark does not serve any of the top two plans in the twelve swing states so the merger does not appear to help CVS is those critical areas. The merger looks like a defense of CVS territory in the East, rather than an offensive drive into important swing states for CVS like Michigan, Ohio, and New York.
Walgreen's Strategy
Some Wall Street analysts have speculated that Walgreen might seek out Medco or Express
Scripts as a merger partner to be in a position to match whatever moves the combined CVSCaremark makes. Our overlapping map analysis suggests otherwise.
One of the most important insights derived by this analysis is that Walgreen does not need any of the Big 3 PBMs to win the coming preferred provider war. 
"Any Willing Provider Laws" As a Strategic Consideration
There are twenty-two state with "any willing provider" (AWP) laws designed to insure that no pharmacy can be denied admittance to a preferred provider network if it is willing to meet the specifications of a provider contract. 22 These laws were a reaction to the emergence of managed care in the 1990's and the use of preferred provider networks as a key technique for holding down healthcare costs. 23 Community pharmacy trade associations have been the prime sponsors of such laws and have been particularly effective at lobbying legislators from rural districts in the South and Plains States to protect community pharmacies from being excluded from pharmacy networks. A "colored" map of AWP states follows:
States with Any Willing Provider Laws
The coming preferred provider war should feature network development with significant co-pay and reimbursement differentials. It is reasonable to assume that PBMs and drugstore chains might be deterred from creating differentiated networks in AWP states. AWP laws as a deterrent might be moot in "blue" and "red" states because of the lack of motivation to go to war in those states.
CVS does have a history of fighting AWP laws. 24 That effort also failed.
The Rhode Island experience may have been a factor in the decision by CVS to seek a merger, rather than a strategic partnership, with Caremark. AWP laws are keyed to explicit contracts.
AWP laws state that if a provider is willing to meet the price concession and related terms of an existing preferred provider contract, that provider cannot be denied a similar offer. Because all transactions between payer (PBM) and provider (drugstore) will be internal for CVS-Caremark companies, no specific contracts need be drawn up between the two. AWP laws only provide access to specific contracts. In AWP states, Caremark could offer toothless "any willing provider" 
